University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Carey Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Carey Law
2013

The Impact of Codification on the Judicial Development of
Copyright
Christopher S. Yoo
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Courts Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Law and
Society Commons, Legislation Commons, Political Theory Commons, and the Public Law and Legal
Theory Commons

Repository Citation
Yoo, Christopher S., "The Impact of Codification on the Judicial Development of Copyright" (2013). Faculty
Scholarship at Penn Carey Law. 1541.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1541

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Carey Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Carey Law by an authorized administrator of Penn
Carey Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

1

The Impact of Codification on the Judicial Development of Copyright
Christopher S. Yoo*
INTRODUCTION
Ever since Wheaton v. Peters rejected the idea of a robust vision of common law
copyright,1 modern copyright has been widely acknowledged to be statutory in nature. At the
same time, before 1976, the copyright statutes employed general language that left most of the
key interpretive issues to the courts. Over time, courts embraced this role, fashioning a wide
variety of doctrines that gave content to the broad directives contained in the statute and
developing new law where necessary to govern important situations that Congress did not
address.2
The Copyright Act of 1976 took a different approach. Congress replaced much of the
general language with more detailed and specific statutory provisions. A key question is what
effect, if any, did this reform legislation have on the role of courts in the development of
copyright. As a general matter, “[w]hen the legislature enters the field, the courts operate under a
narrower delegation.”3 Under some theories of legisprudence, codification displaces judicial
development altogether. Under other theories, judicial lawmaking can continue, but subject to
greater constraints.
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1
33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 658–62 (1834).
2
See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, An Assembly of Idiots?, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1049, 1050, 1061–62 (2002); Joseph P. Liu,
Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 88, 101 (2004); Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Unwinding Sony, 95 CAL.
L. REV. 941, 996, 998 (2007).
3
Samuel Estreicher, Judicial Nullification: Guido Calabresi’s Uncommon Common Law for a Statutory Age, 57
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1164 (1982).
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Since the enactment of the 1976 Act, courts have continued to engage in common law
development in many important areas of copyright law. The question is whether and how this
practice can be squared with the dominant understanding that recognizes the supremacy of the
legislature in determining the scope of the law. Some of the innovations raise unique issues, in
that they take place in areas where Congress has been silent with respect to copyright, but has
enacted specific provisions with respect to patent. It is an open question whether the patent
provisions establish broad policies that should be applied to copyright law or whether the failure
to enact parallel provisions with respect to copyright gives rise to a negative inference that
renders such importation illegitimate.
Arguments raised in the Supreme Court during the briefing and oral argument for
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons have heightened the importance of determining the impact of
codification on the continued judicial development of copyright. The brief filed by the United
States as amicus curiae argued that, even though Congress had twice codified the first sale
doctrine, the Supreme Court retained considerable authority to adjust its contours.4 In so arguing,
the government implicitly took the position, largely accepted by the Court, that codification did
not necessarily deprive precodification decisions of vitality or foreclose courts from continuing
to shape and reshape copyright law.
The propriety of courts continuing to play an active role in articulating and extending
copyright depends on the theory one adopts regarding the proper relationship between courts and
legislatures. From some viewpoints, courts’ ongoing willingness to develop the law is altogether
proper and appropriate. From other perspectives, it is potentially problematic.

4
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 27–29, 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013) (No. 11697).
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This chapter offers an assessment of the propriety of these courts’ actions. Part I
describes four areas in which courts have continued to develop copyright law since 1976: fair
use, copyright misuse, third-party liability, and the first sale doctrine. Part II reviews the leading
theories of legisprudence, examining those that accord courts wide latitude, no latitude, and
limited authority to develop the law. Part III applies these theories to the four substantive areas
described in Part I, while offering some reflections on the judiciary’s authority in areas where
Congress has not yet acted.
I.

FOUR EXAMPLES OF POSTCODIFICATION JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF COPYRIGHT LAW
The enactment of more specific provisions in the Copyright Act of 1976 might have been

expected to attenuate the judicial development of copyright. In a number of areas, however,
courts have continued to play an active role in shaping and reshaping the contours of copyright
law. Four of the most active areas are fair use, copyright misuse, third-party liability, and the first
sale doctrine.
A.

Fair Use
The roots of the fair use doctrine are typically traced to Folsom v. Marsh, in which

Justice Story held that a two-volume work of George Washington’s letters and papers that copied
388 pages of material from a previous twelve-volume set of Washington’s papers infringed the
original work’s copyright.5 Story noted, however, that access to Washington’s papers might be
justifiable depending on “the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value or

5

9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (Story, J.).

3
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the materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the
profits, or superseded the objects, of the original work.”6
Subsequent courts expanded on Justice Story’s suggestion and began to develop the
doctrine of fair use.7 The resulting doctrine was so variegated that courts criticized it as “the
most troublesome in the whole area of copyright”8 and “so flexible as virtually to defy
definition.”9 The two fair use cases that reached the Supreme Court provided little guidance, as
both were affirmed without opinion by an equally divided Court, a resolution that carries no
precedential value.10 The major copyright reform legislation enacted in 1909 did not include a
provision on fair use.11
Congress finally codified fair use in 1976. The statute is striking in its level of detail,
specifically providing that “the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright.”12 The statute further provides,
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use
the factors to be considered shall include–
(1)
the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2)
the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3)
the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and

6

Id.
For a review of the early judicial development of the fair use doctrine, see WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE IN
COPYRIGHT LAW (2d ed. 1995).
8
Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc. 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939).
9
Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
10
See Benny v. Loew’s Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff’d by an equally divided court sub nom. CBS, Inc. v.
Loew’s Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958); Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1362 (Ct. Cl. 1973),
aff’d by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
11
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447 n.29 (1984) (“The Copyright Act of
1909 . . . did not have a ‘fair use’ provision” (citation omitted)).
12
17 U.S.C. § 107.
7
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(4)

the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.13

Moreover, “[t]he fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such
finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.”14
Although most courts have organized their discussions of fair use around these four
factors, some courts have continued to incorporate others into their analysis.15 These include
such considerations as bad faith,16 the public interest,17 and privacy implications.18
B.

Copyright Misuse
Another area of copyright law in which courts have continued to innovate since the

enactment of the 1976 Act is copyright misuse. The doctrine was first recognized in the Fourth
Circuit’s 1990 decision in Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, which held that “a misuse of
copyright defense is inherent in the law of copyright just as a misuse of patent defense is inherent
in patent law.”19 The court based its decision on the clear establishment of a patent misuse
defense by statute, the parallels between patent and copyright under early English law, and “the
similarity of the policies underlying patent and copyright.”20

13

Id.
Id.
15
See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A][5][b] (2005).
16
See Roy Export Co. Establishment v. CBS, Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff’d, 672 F.2d 1095
(2d Cir. 1982).
17
See Castle Rock Enter. v. Carol Pub. Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 146 (2d Cir. 1998).
18
See New Era Pubc’ns Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 2d 1493, 1504–05 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d, 873 F.2d
576 (2d Cir. 1989).
19
911 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1990).
20
Id.
14
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Since the Fourth Circuit’s Lasercomb decision, three additional circuits have recognized
copyright misuse as a defense,21 whereas three other circuits have declined to adopt it.22 In so
doing, some courts have begun to express some discomfort with the lack of statutory
authorization. For example, in Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America Inc., the Federal
Circuit noted that the Supreme Court had given its tacit approval of the copyright misuse defense
in Loew’s, subject to the reservation that “[i]n the absence of any statutory entitlement to a
copyright misuse defense, however, the defense is solely an equitable doctrine.”23
Interestingly, some differences in the application of copyright misuse and patent misuse
have begun to emerge. For example, a 1988 amendment to the patent statute established that
refusal to license does not constitute patent misuse.24 Copyright courts, however, have continued
to rule that refusal to license may constitute copyright misuse.25 In cases where refusals to
license are alleged to violate the antitrust laws, a context that courts have long recognized is
closely related to copyright misuse,26 courts have concluded that the fact that Congress amended
the patent statute to exempt refusals to license from misuse while declining to enact a similar
amendment to the copyright laws suggests that different policies should apply.27

21

See DSC Commc’ns Corp. v. DGI Tech., Inc., 81 F.3d 597, 601–02 (5th Cir. 1996); Practice Mgmt. Info. Cor. v.
Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1997), amended, 133 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 1998); Video Pipeline, Inc.
v. Buena Vista Home Entmt., Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 206 (3d Cir. 2003).
22
See BellSouth Advertising & Publ’g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ’g, Inc., 933 F.2d 952, 961 (11th Cir. 1991),
rev’d on other grounds on reh’g, 999 F.2d 1436, 1446 (1993); Assessment Techs. of Wis., LLC v. WIREdata, Inc.,
350 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2003); Garcia-Goyko v. Law Envt’l Consultants, Inc., 428 F.3d 14, 21 n.7 (1st Cir.
2005).
23
975 F.2d. 832, 846 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
24
35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4).
25
See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1027 n.8 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that “a unilateral refusal
to license a copyright may constitute wrongful exclusionary conduct giving rise to a claim of misuse, but assume
that the ‘desire to exclude others . . . is a presumptively valid business justification for any immediate harm to
consumers’” (quoting Image Tech. Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1218 (9th Cir. 1997)); accord In re
Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 964 F. Supp. 1454, 1461 (D. Kan. 1997).
26
Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 977–78.
27
Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187 (1st Cir.1994).
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C.

Third-Party Liability
Although earlier precedents exist,28 third-part liability under copyright law is traditionally

traced to Justice Holmes’s opinion in Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., which held a filmmaker liable
for creating and distributing unauthorized films based on the copyrighted book, Ben Hur.29 The
fact that the filmmaker did not exhibit the films itself meant that it was not a direct infringer.
This did not absolve it from liability, however, because the filmmaker both expected and
encouraged others to use the film in an infringing manner, which was both “the most
conspicuous purpose for which [the films] could be used, and the one for which especially they
were made.”30 The Court observed that liability for those who did not take part in the final act,
but nonetheless contributed to it, is “recognized in every part of the law.”31 Although the Court
recognized that “nice questions may arise” when “an ordinary article of commerce” is used for
infringement, the filmmaker’s complicity was so flagrant that “no such niceties are involved
here.”32 Subsequent lower court decisions developed the doctrine still further.33
When revising the patent statute in 1952, Congress included a specific provision to
govern third-party liability. The statute imposed vicarious liability on those who knowingly
“actively induce[] infringement of a patent.”34 It also classified as a contributory infringer
anyone who sells “a component of a patented machine . . . or a material or apparatus for use in
practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to
28

See Fishel v. Lueckel, 53 F. 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1892); Scribner v. Straus, 210 U.S. 352 (1908). For a useful review of
the early history of third-party liability doctrine, see Menell & Nimmer, supra note 2, at 996–1005.
29
222 U.S. 55, 60–61 (1911).
30
Id. at 62–63.
31
Id. at 63.
32
Id. at 62.
33
See, e.g., Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971);
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963); M. Witmark & Sons v. Calloway,
22 F.2d 412, 414 (E.D. Tenn. 1927).
34
35 U.S.C. § 271(b).
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be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a
staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use.”35
Congress did not include a similar provision when overhauling the copyright laws in
1976. The Supreme Court did not find the failure to do so of any particular import, concluding in
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc. that “[t]he absence of such express language in
the copyright statute does not preclude the imposition of [third-party] liability for copyright
infringements.”36 Instead, the Court regarded third-party liability as a widely acknowledged
background principle, reasoning that “vicarious liability is imposed in virtually all areas of the
law, and the concept of contributory infringement is merely a species of a broader problem of
identifying the circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual accountable for the actions
of another.”37 In addition to analogizing to Kalem, the Sony Court drew parallels between patent
and copyright, explicitly importing the exception for a “staple article or commodity of commerce
suitable for substantial noninfringing use.”38 Although the Court acknowledged that differences
between these two bodies of law existed, neither was relevant to the area of third-party liability.39
The Court reaffirmed this conclusion in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., holding that “[a]lthough ‘[t]he Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for
infringement committed by another,’ these doctrines of secondary liability emerged from
common law principles and are well established in the law.”40 The immateriality of the copyright
statute was further underscored by the fact that the Court’s principal authority for the doctrine of

35

35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984).
37
Id.
38
Id. at 435–41.
39
Id. at 439 n.19, 442.
40
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005) (citations omitted) (quoting Sony,
464 U.S. at 434; and citing Kalem, 222 U.S. at 62–63; Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162; 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra
note 15, § 12.04[A]).
36
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contributory infringement was a lower court case decided before the enactment of the 1976
Act.41 Similarly, the Court held that its prior decision in Sony “was never meant to foreclose
rules of fault-based liability derived from the common law.”42 Rather than develop the common
law analysis, the Court followed Sony’s lead by analogizing to patent, concluding that the same
reasons that led to the Sony Court to adopt the patent law standard for determining when to
impute the intent to infringe to a third party based on circumstantial evidence also justified
adopting the patent law standard for assessing direct evidence of an unlawful purpose.43 With the
exception of Kalem, the Court built its argument on the authority of lower court patent
precedents, citing those decided before the enactment of the Patent Act of 1952 interchangeably
with those decided after.44 Although the Court noted that third-party liability had been codified
with respect to patent law,45 the failure to include a similar provision in the copyright statute did
not have any effect on its analysis.
D.

First Sale Doctrine
The first sale doctrine originated in the Supreme Court’s 1908 decision in Bobbs-Merrill

C. v. Straus, which arose when retailer R.H. Macy & Co. purchased books from a publisher that
were sold subject to the condition that no dealer was licensed to sell the book for less than one
dollar, yet nonetheless resold them for eighty-nine cents.46 The publisher disclaimed any relief
under contract and relied exclusively on the argument that Macy’s actions violated copyright

41

See id. at 930 (citing Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162).
Id. at 934–35.
43
Id. at 936–37 (“For the same reasons that Sony took the staple-article doctrine of patent law as a model for its
copyright safe-harbor rule, the inducement rule, too, is a sensible one for copyright.”).
44
Id. at 935.
45
Id. at 932, 936 n.11.
46
210 U.S. 339 (1908).
42
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law.47 The Court held that, although copyright holders’ exclusive right of “vending” their
works48 permitted the publisher to determine the price at which it sold its books to Macy’s, it did
not give the publisher the right “to qualify the title of a future purchaser.”49 Indeed, “[t]o add to
the right of exclusive sale the authority to control all future retail sales . . . would give a right not
included in the terms of the statute, and, in our view, extend its operation, by construction,
beyond its meaning.”50 The Court framed its decision as “purely a question of statutory
construction” of the copyright statutes.51 As the Supreme Court would later explain, “once the
copyright owner places a copyrighted item into the stream of commerce by selling it, he has
exhausted his exclusive statutory right to control its distribution.”52
Congress codified the first sale doctrine in the Copyright Act of 1909. After reaffirming
that copyright holders possessed the exclusive right to “reprint, publish, copy, and vend the
copyrighted work” in Section 1,53 Section 41 provided that “nothing in this Act shall be deemed
to forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work the possession of
which has been lawfully obtained.”54 In 1947, this provision was renumbered without change.55
Congress recodified the first sale doctrine in 1976. Section 106 gives copyright holders
six specific rights, including the right to distribute copies, explicitly subject to limitations
enumerated in Sections 107–122.56 Section 109(a) provides the following:
Notwithstanding the provision of section 106(3) [i.e., the exclusive right to
distribute], the owner of a particular copy . . . lawfully made under this title, or
47

Id. at 346.
Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212.
49
Id. at 351.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 350.
52
Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 152 (1998).
53
Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320 § 1(a), 35 Stat. 1075, 1075.
54
§ 41, 35 Stat. at 1084.
55
Act of July 30, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-281, § 27, 61 Stat. 652, 660.
56
17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
48
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any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy.57
The simultaneous enactment of another provision has created a difficult interpretive
question regarding the scope of the first sale doctrine. The 1976 Act also included a provision
that expanded copyright holders’ ability to control importation of unauthorized copies of their
works. Although the Copyright Act of 1909 directed the Customs Service to bar importation of
“piratical copies” of copyrighted works,58 it did not apply to the importation of gray-market
copies authorized only for distribution only in foreign countries. Consequently, Congress enacted
Section 602(a)(1), which provides that “[i]mportation into the United States, without the
authority of the owner of copyright under this title, of copies . . . of a work that have been
acquired outside the United States is an infringement of the exclusive right to distribute copies
. . . under section 106.”59
What was unclear was whether the first sale doctrine codified in Section 109(a) limits the
right granted by Section 602(a) to block importation. Two fact patterns have emerged as
important: (1) copies manufactured abroad and then imported into the United States and (2)
copies manufactured in the United States, exported, and then reimported back into the United
States.
With respect to the latter fact pattern, the Supreme Court’s unanimous 1998 decision in
Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research International, Inc. held that copies that were
manufactured in the United States, exported, and then reimported were subject to the first sale
doctrine.60 Because the copies at issue were manufactured in the U.S., the Court had no occasion

57

Id. § 109(a).
§ 30, 35 Stat. at 1082.
59
17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1).
60
523 U.S. 135 (1998).
58
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to address the former fact pattern. Indeed, Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence explicitly noted that
the Court did not “resolve cases in which the allegedly infringing imports were manufactured
abroad” without drawing any comment or objection from the majority.61
Absent specific guidance from the Supreme Court, the lower courts were left to address
the former fact pattern as best they could. The seminal case was the pre-Quality King district
court decision in CBS v. Scorpio Music Distributors, Inc., which held that Section 109(a) applied
only to works “lawfully made under this title” and thus did not apply to foreign manufactured
copies.62 Although some courts (including the Third Circuit) questioned Scorpio in dicta,63 the
Ninth Circuit adopted the Scorpio rule.64 Thus by 1996, one court commented, “The courts . . .
appear to be in agreement that that the first sale doctrine does not apply to foreign manufactured
works copyrighted in the U.S.”65 The Ninth Circuit later expressed concerns about the
implications of this holding, noting that it would “render the first sale doctrine wholly
inapplicable to foreign manufactured goods, even after the goods have been lawfully imported
into the United States” and would give “foreign manufactured goods . . . greater copyright
protection than goods manufactured in the United States.”66 The Ninth Circuit thus held the first
sale inapplicable only when the copies were both manufactured and first sold abroad. Foreign

61

Id. at 154 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
569 F. Supp. 47, 49 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
63
Sebastian Int’l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 847 F.2d 1093, 1098 n.1 (3d Cir. 1988); see also Cosmair,
Inc. v. Dynamite Enters., Inc., 226 U.S.P.Q. 344 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
64
See BMG Music v. Perez, 952 F.2d 318, 319–20 (9th Cir. 1991); Hearst Corp. v. Stark, 639 F. Supp. 970 (N.D.
Cal. 1986). Two other cases often cited as adopting the Scorpio rule are not squarely on point. See T.B. Harms Co.
v. Jem Records, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 1575 (D.N.J. 1987); Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Elcon Indus., 564 F. Supp. 937
(E.D. Mich. 1982).
65
Summit Tech., Inc. v. High-Line Med. Instruments Co. 922 F. Supp. 299, 312 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
66
Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 38 F.3d 477, 482 n.8 (9th Cir 1994).
62
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manufactured copies whose first sale occurred within the United States remained subject to the
first sale doctrine.67
After the Supreme Court decided Quality King in 1998, lower courts had to determine
whether anything in the Supreme Court’s decision altered the existing consensus. They
uniformly concluded that Quality King supported the conclusion that Section 109(a) does not
apply to copies manufactured and first sold abroad.68 Interestingly, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in a Ninth Circuit decision, only to split 4–4 and affirm the judgment by an equally
divided Court after Justice Kagan recused herself.69 The issue arose again in John Wiley & Sons
v. Kirtsaeng, in which a divided panel of the Second Circuit again held that the first sale doctrine
codified by Section 109(a) does not apply to copies manufactured in other countries.70 In so
holding, the Second Circuit rejected the Ninth Circuit’s distinction between foreign
manufactured copies where the first sale took place abroad and those where the first sale took
place in the United States.71 District Judge Murtha, sitting by designation, dissented.72
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Kirtsaeng.73 For the purposes of this chapter, the
most interesting position was taken by the Solicitor General, who argued that the Court should
resolve the case by applying the principles in embodied Bobbs-Merrill.74 The government

67

Denbicare U.S.A. Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 84 F.3d 1143, 1149–50 (9th Cir. 1996).
See Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982, 987–90 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d by an equally divided
Court, 131 S. Ct. 565 (2011); Pearson Educ., Inc. v. Kumar, 721 F. Supp. 2d 166, 176–78 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Pearson
Educ., Inc. v. Arora, 717 F. Supp. 2d 374, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Pearson Educ., Inc. v. Liu, 656 F. Supp. 2d 407,
412–13 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Microsoft Corp. v. Big Boy Distribution LLC, 589 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1317 (S.D. Fla.
2008); Pearson Educ., Inc. v. Liao, No. 07-Civ-2423 (SHS), 2008 WL 2073491, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2008);
Swatch S.A. v. New City Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1254–55 (S.D. Fla. 2006); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Norwalk
Distribs., Inc., 2003 WL 22722410, at *2–*4 (CD. Cal. Mar. 13, 2003); Lingo Corp. v. Topix, Inc., No. 01 Civ.
2863(RMB), 2003 WL 223454, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2003).
69
131 S. Ct. 565 (2011) (per curiam).
70
654 F.3d 210, 218–22 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013).
71
Id. at 221.
72
Id. at 226 (Murtha, J., dissenting).
73
132 S. Ct. 1905 (2012) (mem.).
74
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 4, at 27–29.
68
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asserted in effect that Bobbs-Merrill continued to have vitality notwithstanding Congress’s
subsequent codification of the first sale doctrine, a claim that drew substantial attention during
oral argument.75 The Supreme Court eventually agreed, invoking the canon of construction
recognizing that “‘[w]hen a statute covers an issue previously governed by the common law,’ we
must presume that ‘Congress intended to retain the substance of the common law.’” 76
II.

THEORIES OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL LAWMAKING
All four areas of copyright law discussed earlier exhibit the courts’ continuing

willingness to develop the law despite the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976 and without
engaging in a close examination of the text and enactment history of the statute. The propriety of
the courts’ actions depends on the relevant theories of legisprudence, which span a broad
spectrum. At one pole are theories that recognize broad judicial authority to revise and overturn
statutes regardless of legislative intent. At the other pole are theories that suggest that
codification categorically forecloses all further judicial development of the law. In between are
theories that recognize limited judicial authority to continue to innovate.
A.

Broad Judicial Authority to Develop the Law in the Face of Adverse Statutory
Language
One school of thought holds that courts should feel free to overrule or revise statutes on

the same terms as judicial precedents. Lord Coke offered a classic statement of this position in
Bonham’s Case, in which he stated his belief that “when an Act of Parliament is against common
right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed the common law will control it and

75

Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, 29, 38, 42, 44–49, 52, John Wiley & Sons v. Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2012)
(No. 11-697), available at https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/11-697.pdf.
76
133 S. Ct. 1351, 1363 (2013) (quoting Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2289–90 n.13 (2010)).
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adjudge such Act to be void.”77 Coke’s Institutes lauded the common law as “the perfection of
reason.”78 Under this view, law was not the product of positive enactments and declarations, but
rather “a ‘brooding omnipresence’ of Reason, of which decisions [and presumably statutes] were
merely evidence and not themselves the controlling formulations.”79 The modern consensus
rejects the view that the common law is a preexisting, natural construct awaiting discovery. As
Justice Holmes noted in his now famous dissent in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, “The
common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some
sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be identified.”80
Blackstone echoed Coke’s belief in the perfection of the common law,81 but
acknowledged legislative supremacy when he conceded that “[w]here the common law and a
statute differ, the common law gives place to the statute.”82 Moreover, he rejected claims “that
acts of parliament contrary to reason are void,” because permitting judges to reject statutes they
found to be unreasonable would “set the judicial power above that of the legislature, which
would be subversive of all government.”83 Blackstone concluded, however, that “the most
universal and effectual way of discovering the true meaning of a law, when the words are
dubious, is by considering the reason and the spirit of it.... For when this reason ceases, the law
itself ought to cease with it.”84 Blackstone also allowed that “where some collateral matter arises
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out of the general words, and happens to be unreasonable; there the judges are in decency to
conclude that this consequence was not foreseen by the parliament, and therefore they are at
liberty to expound the statute by equity, and only quoad hoc disregard it.”85 To the extent that the
statutory text is clear, “there is no court that has power to defeat the intent of the legislature.”86
Thus, in the words of the leading commentator on statutory interpretation, “[t]o the extent
Blackstone saw judges as agents . . . , they were agents of the common law as much as agents of
Parliament.”87 U.S. commentators issued similar calls for interpreting statutes in a way that
preserved the capacity for expansion and adaptation associated with the common law.88
Arguments against judicial deference to statutes found a modern voice in Guido
Calabresi, who was concerned that legislative inertia was causing the ever-growing body of
statutory law to become increasingly out of step with the legal landscape and current majoritarian
preferences.89 The inability of legislatures to keep up with the pace of change leads courts to
distort their reasoning either by straining to find clear statutes ambiguous or to declare statutes
unconstitutional.90 Calabresi’s solution was to treat statutes the same as common law
precedents,91 even permitting judges to override statutes that have become obsolete.92 Calabresi
offered a nod towards legislative supremacy when he acknowledged that it would be “infinitely
preferable” for legislatures to enact legislation authorizing courts to revise statutes. The absence
of such legislative authorization did not give him much pause, however, as he criticized devoting
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any effort to analyzing when courts could revise statutes without explicit authorization
“premature” and even “wasteful and even misguided.”93 Instead, Calabresi thought it better “to
get on with the task” of considering how (rather than when) it should be done.94
More recently, William Eskridge has advocated a more evolutive approach that he calls
“dynamic statutory interpretation,” which Eskridge acknowledges is “related to, but stops far
short of” Calabresi’s proposal.95 Like Calabresi, Eskridge is motivated in large part by the limits
of legislative processes, using the tools of positive political theory to take this skepticism to a
new level, arguing that legislative outcomes typically reflect rent seeking and special interests
rather than the popular will.96 As a result, Eskridge rejects exclusive reliance on methods of
interpretation that seek to construe statutes based on the statutory text or legislative intent.97
Instead, his approach seeks to provide a corrective to the overrepresentation and
underrepresentation inherent in legislative processes that can cause enactments to deviate from
majoritarian preferences.98 He argues, “Sometimes the circumstances will be materially different
from those contemplated by the statutory drafters,” in which case courts can “go . . . against the
drafters’ expectations, which have been negated because important assumptions have been
undone.”99 Thus, “[w]hen the assumptions of a society or culture underlying a statute are
discredited,” courts seeking “[t]o fulfill the original statutory functions” must “consider the new
circumstances, and doing so often leads to a dramatically dynamic interpretation of the
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statute.”100 When faced with such changes, a statute “can change its form to deal with the policy
chasm introduced by the obsolescence of some of its assumptions.”101
Eskridge’s initial statement of his theory recognized that the statutory text and the
expectations of the legislature that enacted the statute represented the primary considerations
when interpreting statutes, conceding that “when a clear text and supportive legislative history
suggest the same answer, they typically will control.”102 Current policies and social conditions
influence statutory construction only when “the statutory text is not clear and the original
legislative expectations have been overtaken by subsequent changes in society and law.”103 His
later work envisions a more expansive role for courts, presenting the evolutive perspective as
being coequal with text and legislative history.104 Under this approach, current norms and values
can alter the interpretation of a clear text when its “plain meaning is unreasonable and apparently
unanticipated by the legislature.”105
Calls for allowing judges to negate or modify statutes based on contemporary values have
met with sharp criticism. Commentators have challenged assertions that courts are better
institutionally suited than legislatures to keep up with the times, noting that legislation was
initially viewed as a solution to the courts’ inability to keep pace with social and economic
change and that judicial lawmaking has led to its share of outdated doctrines.106 Arguments
motivated by the flaws in the legislative process must also take into account that judicial
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processes suffer from institutional shortcomings of their own.107 Moreover, determining when a
statute is out of sync with contemporary values is likely to prove difficult, and the existing
proposals fail to provide a clear basis for determining when a statute is so obsolete as to need
judicial revision.108 The absence of such criteria raises serious concerns about whether the
resulting approach to interpretation will be too malleable.109 The lack of interpretive constraints
risks politicizing decisions about when a statute should be overridden.110 Most glaringly,
permitting unelected and unaccountable judges to overturn the actions of the politically
accountable branches raises serious problems from the standpoint of democracy.111
The conventional wisdom is that recent Supreme Court decisions have exhibited a
tendency to favor textualism over evolutive approaches.112 Although Eskridge denigrates
legislative supremacy as a “shibboleth,” he concedes that it is a “shibboleth with bite.”113 Text is
given the most weight114 and, in Eskridge’s early work, is even controlling.115 Indeed, “[t]he
evolutive perspective must yield where the text and evidence of legislative expectation support
another interpretation.”116 Under the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, the question has thus
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become how to reconcile the judiciary’s role in explicating statutes with the democratic
commitment to legislative supremacy.
B.

Complete Displacement of Judicial Authority to Develop the Law
At the other extreme are schools of thought that view codification as completely

displacing courts’ authority to develop legal principles. In the words of the leading treatise on
statutory interpretation, “general and comprehensive legislation . . . indicates a legislative intent
that the statute should totally supersede and replace the common law dealing with the subject
matter.”117 Areas where legislation is sometimes said to have almost entirely displaced common
law include the Uniform Commercial Code, labor law, and antitrust.118
It would be a mistake, however, to regard all major codifications as displacing prior
sources of law. As an initial matter, although some codifications aspired to be comprehensive,
others were intended only to cover a portion of existing law.119 This is why, according to a
leading commentary on codification, “[t]here is no a priori jurisprudentially correct relationship
between the codes and the pre-code materials.”120 Codes can represent either “a culmination of
the pre-code materials” or a self-conscious “break . . . from pre-code archaic law.”121
Even if intended to be revisionary, codifications generally leave untouched common law
in areas falling outside the scope of the statute. Moreover, that courts retain some freedom to
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fashion equitable corrections to mitigate unfair outcomes that may arise under mechanical
application of the statute.122 In the words of a noted judge,
A primary function of any codification of common law . . . is to displace prior legal rules.
The same cannot be said of prior equitable principles. Equity was developed to do justice in
individual case by carving expectations to and otherwise modifying legal rules. Thus, a
codification of legal rules does not automatically displace the equitable principles which
supplement them.123
Thus, codification does not necessarily foreclose later courts from consulting
preenactment common law. Nor does it necessarily foreclose courts from continuing to make
revisions to an area of law. The easiest case is when the statute itself invites continued judicial
development, which poses no analytical problems.124 The question is more difficult in the
absence of such an invitation. As discussed later, the significance of such silence may depend on
the background understandings that frame the codification. The omission may suggest a
legislative intent not to allow courts to continue to develop the doctrine and will deter judges’
willingness to do so, depending on Congress’s intent.125
C.

Limited Authority for Judicial Development
Between the two extremes of near-complete judicial latitude and complete judicial

displacement lies a middle ground that permits a prominent role for judicial development while
simultaneously paying sufficient respect to legislative supremacy. Legislatures may delegate
such authority to courts. Alternatively, courts may construe statutes in light of other statutes.
122
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1.

Affirmative Delegation of Authority to the Judiciary

The strongest case for a strong judicial role in shaping the law after codification arises
when the statute affirmatively confers the authority to do so on the courts. The Sherman Antitrust
Act has long been regarded as a prime example of congressional delegation of the responsibility
for fashioning legal principles in a common law fashion to the judiciary.126 Other leading
examples include § 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act127 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.128 When Congress
delegates such authority to the courts, common law development poses no conflict with
legislative supremacy.
Legislative delegations of lawmaking authority to courts are rarely explicit, however,
which raises questions about what indicia are sufficient to signal Congress’s intent to confer this
power on the judiciary. Some find it sufficient that the statute employed common law concepts
as the basis for liability.129 Others look to the legislative history for indications of Congress’s
intention to delegate to the courts the authority to flesh out the law.130
Whether a statute cuts off the courts’ power to continue to fashion relief is thus itself a
matter of statutory interpretation. For example, the Supreme Court looked to legislative intent
when determining whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 or a statute authorizing courts to
126
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sanction attorneys who unreasonably multiply proceedings abrogated a district court’s inherent
power to sanction bad-faith conduct by one of the parties.131 Moreover, because the typical
statute does not purport to cover all areas of law, courts’ authority to continue to address areas
that fall outside its scope remains unaffected.
2.

Analogies to Other Statutes (Particularly Patent Law)

Another possible source for interpreting statutes that is consistent with legislative
supremacy is another statute. During the early twentieth century, a number of noted scholars
called for a revival of the English doctrine known as the “equity of the statute,” which “treat[s] a
statute much more as we treat a judicial precedent, as both a declaration and a source of law, and
as a premise for legal reasoning.”132 This approach regards statutes “as sources of law which by
judicial decision could be extended to apply to situations analogous to those embraced within
their terms.”133 Even proponents of the principle, however, acknowledged its rejection by
English and U.S. courts.134 The doctrine still appears in judicial decisions from time to time,135
and subsequent scholars have again called for its revival.136 These suggestions have generally
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been rejected, however, as inconsistent with the legislative supremacy inherent in a constitutional
democracy.137
Although modern law has rejected appeals to treat statutes in a manner similar to
common law precedents, it has shown greater willingness to draw analogies between statutes that
cover similar subject matter. A longstanding canon of construction calls for statutes that are in
pari materia (on the same subject) to be construed in a similar manner.138 Approaches that
“consider one statute’s meaning in light of other statutes . . . ha[ve] been especially influential on
the Court.”139 As demonstrated in Part I, the Supreme Court analogized to patent law in Sony and
Grokster when determining the scope of third-party liability.140 The Lasercomb court did the
same with respect to copyright misuse.141 Other leading copyright decisions have also been based
largely on patent precedents.142
On other occasions, the Court has warned against drawing simplistic analogies between
copyright and patent. Bobbs-Merrill, for example, declined a call to extend patent principles to
copyright in part because “there are differences between the patent and copyright statutes in the
extent in the protection granted by them.”143 Although the Sony Court based its decision on a
broad analogy between patent and copyright, it noted that copyright and patent were different in
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important ways without exploring the nature of the differences and any possible implications.144
Moreover, in Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Court based its argument for sustaining the constitutionality
of the copyright term extension primarily on patent precedents.145 At the same time, it relied on
the differences between patent and copyright when rejecting arguments that the statute failed to
incorporate the quid pro quo between authors and the public.146
It would thus be improper for courts simply to assume that copyright and patent law are
analogous in all aspects. Instead, whether two statutes should be read together is itself a matter of
legislative intent.147 Peter Menell and David Nimmer have provided a useful framework for
determining when copyright laws are properly interpreted in pari materia with other statute.
Their careful review of the legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976 revealed that its
provisions could be divided into five categories:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Enacted provisions that explicitly drew on patent law;
Proposed provisions that explicitly drew on patent law, but were not
enacted;
Enacted provisions that self-consciously diverged from the approach taken
by patent law;
Enacted provisions that drew on sources of law other than patent law;
Enacted provisions that drew on both patent and trademark law.148

Courts are most justified in drawing on patent law with respect to enacted provisions that
were modeled on patent law in whole or in part (categories 1 and 5). Conversely, reference to
patent law is inappropriate for provisions that either affirmatively rejected the approach taken by
patent law (category 3) or that were based on patent law, but were not enacted by Congress
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(category 2). Provisions based on other laws (category 4) should be interpreted according to the
nonpatent source of law actually invoked.149
Interestingly, related statutes can give rise to negative inferences as well as broad
analogies. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the inclusion of language in one
statute and the omission of parallel language in a related statute suggest that Congress did not
intend the doctrine established by that language to apply to the second area of law. Consider, for
example, Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., in which the Court held that the government could not
recover cleanup costs under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA).150
The Court contrasted the omission of statutory language explicitly authorizing the recovery of
cleanup costs from RCRA with the inclusion of a specific provision authorizing such a recovery
in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), the other major federal statute addressing toxic waste.151 In the words of the Court,
“Congress thus demonstrated in CERCLA that it knew how to provide for the recovery of
cleanup costs, and that the language used to define remedies under RCRA does not provide that
remedy.”152
The Court followed similar reasoning in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School
District, in which it focused on inclusion of a particular language in one statute and the omission
of that language in a related statute when addressing the applicability of respondeat superior
under two leading civil rights statutes.153 A previous decision holding agency principles
applicable to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was based on statutory language imposing
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liability on “an employer,” which was defined to include “any agent.”154 The omission of a
comparable reference to agents in Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 created
the negative inference that agency principles did not apply.155 The Court has drawn similar
conclusions in numerous other cases.156
Practical considerations suggest that courts should take care when drawing such a
negative inference. Legislative silence is ambiguous in that it may signal a failure to focus on an
issue rather than an affirmative rejection.157 Moreover, the negative inference depends on what
has been called the “one Congress fiction,” which presumes that every instantiation of the
legislature is aware of the work done by previous Congresses and works to weave all subsequent
legislation into a seamless whole.158
The foregoing discussion underscores the dangers associated with adopting either the
polar extreme of allowing judges broad authority to revise statutes or the opposite presumption
that an enactment completely displaces further judicial development. The former is inconsistent
with the commitment to democracy. The latter is not a blanket principle, but rather a matter of
legislative intent that raises questions of both how much judicial authority is displaced within the
scope of the statute and of the precise location of the boundaries of the displacement. Although
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limiting judges to drawing on the approaches taken by related statutes is easier to reconcile with
legislative supremacy, reflexively drawing broad analogies between copyright and patent would
be a mistake. Instead, courts must determine whether the legislature intended the statutes to be
read together and, if so, whether a positive or negative inference would be more appropriate.
III.

A REEXAMINATION OF THE EXAMPLES OF CONTINUING JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT

The various theories of legisprudence in turn inform whether continued judicial
development in the areas of fair use, misuse, third-party liability, and the first sale doctrine is
appropriate. What emerges is not a blanket approach that treats various levels of judicial
involvement in a categorical manner. Instead, it yields a context-sensitive inquiry that depends
on a close examination of the indicia of legislative intent with respect to the judiciary’s role.
A.

Fair Use
Of the four examples discussed earlier, fair use represents the easiest case for justifying

ongoing judicial development. Both the statutory text and the context surrounding its enactment
reveal a legislative intent to delegate to the courts a continuing role in developing the contours of
the doctrine.
Looking first at the statutory text, both the preamble and the four-factor test enumerated
by the fair use statute signal Congress’s expectation that courts would continue to incorporate
new considerations into the fair use analysis. For example, when enumerating examples and
considerations, the text uses the terms “including,” “such as,” and “shall include.”159 As the
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Supreme Court noted in Campbell,160 the inclusion of these terms indicates Congress’s intent that
the enumerated criteria be regarded as illustrative and not limitative.”161 Moreover, as the
Supreme Court concluded in Harper & Row, the legislative history similarly indicates that “[t]he
factors enumerated in the section are not meant to be exclusive: ‘[S]ince the doctrine is an
equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the
question must be decided on its own facts.’”162 The Supreme Court has noted that the legislative
history indicates that “‘the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a
case-by-case basis’”163 and that “Congress . . . intended that courts continue the common-law
tradition of fair use adjudication.”164
Thus, the presence of clear legislative authorization renders continued judicial
development of fair use unproblematic under any theory. On the contrary, the leading schools of
legisprudence and constitutional theory arguably place the courts under the affirmative
obligation to do play an active role in determining the contours of fair use.
B.

Misuse
At first blush, continued judicial development in the area of copyright misuse appears to

be more problematic. Not only does the statute lack any provision that can be construed as an
express delegation of authority to the courts; the inclusion of specific language in the Patent Act
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of 1952 recognizing the patent misuse defense and the omission of similar language in the
Copyright Act of 1976 arguably create negative implications with respect to copyright misuse.
Again, a close analysis of the statutes and the context surrounding their enactment reveals
subtleties that a more categorical analysis might overlook. The patent statute does not define
misuse directly. Instead, it defines certain conduct that cannot constitute misuse.165 The structure
of this provision thus necessarily recognizes patent misuse as a preexisting background principle
in front of which the statute was enacted. Moreover, by its own terms, the statute only exempts
certain practices from patent misuse doctrine, which only makes sense if the affirmative contours
of the doctrine were already established under another source of law and left undisturbed by the
amendment. This provision is thus better regarded as a surgical correction to law based on a
prior, nonstatutory source of law rather than a comprehensive displacement of existing law.
The limited nature of the statute makes it difficult to draw any strong negative inferences
from the failure to include a similar provision in the copyright statute. Quite the contrary, by
tacitly confirming the existence of a preexisting patent misuse doctrine, the patent statute
implicitly acknowledges the possibility that misuse stems from a nonstatutory source that may
well be applicable to copyright.
As the Court noted in Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., which first presented patent
misuse in its mature form, patent misuse doctrine stems from the line of precedents holding that
practices designed to extend the inventor’s monopoly beyond the scope of the patent violate the
antitrust laws.166 The Morton Salt Court applied the “principle of general application that courts,
and especially courts of equity, may appropriately withhold their aid where the plaintiff is using
165
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the right asserted contrary to the public.”167 The Court would later characterize patent misuse as
an extension of the equitable doctrine of unclean hands, under which the courts could refuse to
give aid to a party that was violating the antitrust laws.168 The connection between patent and
antirust is so strong that the Supreme Court would later note that “the patent laws . . . are in pari
materia with the antitrust laws.”169 Moreover, the patent misuse and antitrust laws became
deeply intertwined, with patent misuse cases informing antitrust law and vice versa.170
The Supreme Court’s antitrust jurisprudence has long suggested that similar principles
apply to copyright law as well. In its 1948 decision in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,
the Court cited its patent misuse precedents as the primary authority for holding that bundling
copyrighted movies together (a practice known as block booking) violated the antitrust laws.171
The Court drew a similar conclusion in United States v. Loew’s, Inc. with respect to the block
booking of copyrighted television programs.172 In so holding, the Court again invoked its patent
misuse precedents, holding that just as patent law prohibited the use of tying arrangements to
extend a legal monopoly to other products, so too were such practices impermissible under
copyright.173 Both Paramount Pictures and Loew’s were antitrust cases and as such did not
explicitly recognize copyright misuse, but lower courts have regarded the Court’s citation of
patent misuse cases in these cases as an implicit endorsement of the doctrine with respect to
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copyright.174 To the extent that the interplay between antitrust and copyright is likely the same as
the interplay between antitrust and patent, the same considerations supporting patent misuse
arguably also support recognizing copyright misuse.175
Holding that copyright and patent are in pari materia for the purpose of recognizing
copyright misuse as a defense does not necessarily extend to all of the doctrine’s particulars.
Consider the question whether refusal to license can constitute misuse. Some courts have
analogized between these two areas of law and cited the 1988 amendment explicitly providing
that refusal to license cannot constitute patent misuse176 to justify extending the same principle to
copyright misuse.177 Other courts have drawn the opposite conclusion, drawing a negative
inference from Congress’s failure to enact a similar amendment to the copyright statute.178 Thus,
concluding that copyright and patent are in pari materia with respect to recognizing the
copyright misuse defense does not necessitate treating copyright and patent as in pari materia for
all aspects of misuse.
C.

Third-Party Liability
Compared with fair use and copyright misuse, continuing judicial development of the

contours of third-party liability is more problematic. In contrast to fair use, the statute does not
evince any legislative delegation of authority to courts to continue to develop the law.
Moreover, unlike with misuse, Congress did enact a comprehensive statute to cover third-party
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liability for patent infringement.179 The more expansive nature of the patent statute with respect
to third-party liability is more likely to give rise to a negative inference regarding third-party
liability with respect to copyright.
Despite the absence of a specific provision governing third-party liability, some courts
have regarded the text of the 1976 amendments as supporting the imposition of third-party
liability. One of the central changes effected by the Copyright Act of 1976 was its new definition
of infringement providing that “the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to
do and to authorize” the specified rights associated with copyright protection, including
reproduction, the preparation of derivative works, distribution, performance, and display.180 This
language suggests that facilitation of unauthorized uses arguably constitutes direct infringement
of the copyright holder’s exclusive right to authorize uses of the copyrighted work. Indeed, the
Ninth Circuit has concluded that the addition of the words “to authorize” “was intended to
remove the confusion surrounding contributory and vicarious infringement.”181 It noted the
Supreme Court’s conclusion in Sony that this language establishes that “‘an infringer is not
merely one who uses a work without authorization by the copyright owner, but also one who
authorizes the use of a copyrighted work without actual authority from the copyright owner.’”182
This textual analysis draws further support from the enactment context. As a subsequent
Ninth Circuit decision noted, the legislative history specifically provides the following:
Use of the phrase “to authorize” is intended to avoid any questions as to the
liability of contributory infringers. For example a person who lawfully acquires an
authorized copy of a motion picture would be an infringer if he or she engages in
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the business of renting it out to others for purposes of unauthorized public
performance.183
Another portion of the legislative history ignored by the courts but identified by Menell
and Nimmer notes that the House Committee explicitly rejected an amendment to exempt dance
halls from copyright liability, concluding that “no justification exists for changing existing law,”
which provides for vicarious liability on those who actively supervise a place where
performances occur and who expect commercial gain from those performances.184 Other courts
have drawn the same conclusion.185
The Sony Court could therefore have based third-party liability squarely on the copyright
statute itself and used the pre-1976 decisions to determine its contours. Instead, the Court noted
the difficulty of attributing third-party liability because “[t]he Copyright Act does not expressly
render anyone liable for infringement committed by another,” in contrast to the patent statute,
which explicitly provides for liability for inducement and contributory infringement.186 The
Court nonetheless held that “[t]he absence of such express language in the copyright statute does
not preclude the imposition of liability for copyright infringements on certain parties who have
not themselves engaged in the infringing activity.”187 Instead of deriving from the statute, thirdparty liability stemmed from broad principles that are applied in all areas of the law.188
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Rather than follow this reasoning to its logical conclusion, the Court borrowed the “staple
article of commence” and “substantial noninfringing use” tests from the patent statute.189 Given
the clear statements of desire to codify existing law and the absence of any indication of any
intent to import the patent law standard, the Supreme Court would have been better served to
turn to the pre-1976 copyright law as a guide.190 The Grokster Court followed suit by relying
primarily on patent law.191 It did augment the patent analogy with a discussion of pre-1976
copyright cases.192 The borrowing has become reciprocal. Patent cases have begun to borrow
back from copyright law despite their differences (although to the extent the copyright
precedents on third-party liability are in effect construing patent law, this reverse borrowing is
unproblematic).193
Any commonality that may exist between copyright and patent with respect to third-party
liability stems from the fact that they draw from the same source: tort law.194 Some courts have
recognized that third-party liability is properly based in tort law and turned to the pre-1976
copyright cases rather than patent law.195 Analyzing how this difference in analytical approach
would change copyright law is beyond the scope of this chapter. For present purposes, it suffices
to note that the difference should matter to those who care about democratic legitimacy and
legislative supremacy. Basing third-party liability in tort also provides greater room for judicial
development than does a broad analogy to patent law. It would certainly have placed less focus
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on the meaning of terms such as “staple article of commerce” and “substantial noninfringing
use.”
D.

The First Sale Doctrine
As the briefing and oral argument in Kirtsaeng demonstrated, the Supreme Court is

directly confronting the extent to which codification limits the propriety of drawing on judicial
sources of law when determining the scope of the first sale doctrine. Courts must determine both
the extent to which they can look to precodification judicial precedents for guidance and their
ability to effect additional postcodification changes in the manner of associated with the common
law.
As noted earlier, the role of courts in developing copyright law is itself a matter of
legislative intent. In contrast to the case of fair use, there is no statutory language or legislative
history indicating any intent to confer on the courts the authority to shape the first sale doctrine.
Nor is the first sale doctrine a carve out enacted in front of a backdrop of preexisting
extrastatutory legal principles, as was the case with the patent misuse principles that were
transferred to copyright. Nor is there any basis for resolving the question by analogizing to patent
law, as is the case with third-party liability. The legislative history accompanying the most recent
codification of the first sale doctrine indicated that Section 109 “restates and confirms” the
principles “established by the court decisions and section 27 of the present law,”196 including
first and foremost Bobbs-Merrill, which explicitly disavowed drawing any analogies to patent
law.
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Instead, there are strong indications that Congress intended courts to look to the statute
instead of the common law when determining the contours of the first sale doctrine. Section 106
enumerates six exclusive rights conferred on copyright holders, including the right to distribute
that forms the basis for the first sale doctrine, subject to the restrictions enumerated in the
following sections. The legislative history indicates that “[t]he approach of the bill is to set forth
the copyright owner’s exclusive rights in broad terms in section 106, and then to provide various
limitations, qualifications, or exemptions in the 12 sections that follow. Thus, everything in
section 106 is made ‘subject to sections 107 through 118,’ and must be read in conjunction with
those provisions.”197 In addition the Report language describes Section 109 as a restatement of
the first sale doctrine, which suggests that Congress intended it to be its authoritative
statement.198
The language of the Supreme Court’s decision in Quality King corroborates the statutory
nature of the first sale doctrine under current law. It noted that although Bobbs-Merrill
represented a judicial construction of the statutory right to “vend” the copyrighted work, the
comparable right under current law is the right to “distribute,” and “[t]he comparable limitation
on that right is provided not by judicial interpretation, but by an express statutory provision.”199
In other words, “the basic holding in Bobbs-Merrill is now codified in § 109(a).”200
Moreover, the Court’s analysis of whether the first sale doctrine restricted § 602(a) was
entirely statutory in nature. Instead of prohibiting unauthorized distribution directly, Section
602(a) instead provides that unauthorized importation “is an infringement of the exclusive right
to distribute copies . . . under section 106.” In other words, Section 602(a) simply defines one
197
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aspect of the distribution right created by section 106. According to the statutory text, all Section
106 rights are subject to the restrictions of Section 109(a). Because Section 602(a) claims are
simply one type of Section 106 claim, they are necessarily subject to Section 109(a).201 This
reasoning did not invoke any form of common law decision making, but instead focused on the
import of the “literal text.”202 The Court then focused on how that construction was consistent
with other provisions of the copyright statute.203 The Court closed by declaring all policy
considerations to be irrelevant.204 Similarly, the primary thrust of the Supreme Court’s reasoning
in Kirtsaeng focused on the plain meaning of the text of Section 109(a).205
There is an argument based on the legislative history that would treat precodification
decisions as an appropriate source of law. The House and Senate Reports accompanying the
1909 Act indicated that Section 41’s codification of the first sale doctrine was “not intended to
change in any way existing law.”206 The House and Senate Reports accompanying the 1976 Act
similarly indicated that Section 109 simply “restates and confirms” the principles “established by
the court decisions and section 27 of the present law.”207 Moreover, the Supreme Court observed
in Quality King, “There is no reason to assume that Congress intended either § 109(a) or the
earlier codifications of the [first sale] doctrine to limit its broad scope.”208 This suggests that
courts might be justified in basing their constructions of Section 109(a) on precodification
judicial decisions. Such a conclusion would be at odds with the textualist approach adopted by
the Court in Quality King and would not convince those who reject legislative history as a
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legitimate basis for statutory interpretation. Moreover, even if successful, such an argument
would not give courts any authority to continue to refashion the scope of the first sale doctrine.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Kirtsaeng recognized the continuing relevance of
precedents predating the 1976 Act, albeit one based more in text than legislative history. As
noted earlier, the Court invoked a canon of construction that when confronting a statute covering
subject matter previously governed by common law, courts “must presume that ‘Congress
intended to retain the substance of the common law.’” 209 Interestingly, the Court bases most of
its analysis on the law’s hostility towards restraints on the alienation of chattels, which Justice
Breyer traced back to Coke’s Institutes. Only in the end does the opinion note the absence of
any distinction based on geography in Bobbs-Merrill as well as the Solicitor General’s
concession that that decision “would not preclude the ‘first sale’ defense form applying to
authorized copies made overseas.”210
While certainly plausible, the Court’s reasoning seems incomplete. As an initial matter,
no judicial decision addressed whether the first sale doctrine applied to foreign-manufactured
works until the 1983 district court decision in Scorpio,211 which was decided long after the 1976
Act was passed. The Court’s espousal of adherence to the common law amounts to deference to
post-enactment lower-court decisions, a practice inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s usual
modus operandi and unlikely to yield useful insights into congressional intent. At the same time,
the Court manipulates the applicable common law baseline by shifting the focus from restraints
on the sale of copyrighted works in particular to restraints on alienation of property in the
abstract.
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Moreover, as Karl Llewellyn pointed out in his landmark critique of the canons of
construction, the principle that statues are to be read in accordance with their common law
antecedents is opposed by the canon that the common law gives way to statutes that revise an
entire body of law.212 Put a different way, the whole point of many statutes is to change the law
by clarifying ambiguities, by resolving inconsistencies, or by framing the analysis in a more
unified and analytically consistent way. Whether any particular part of a codification simply
restates existing law or effects some changes is an issue that must be analyzed, not simply
presumed.
In short, the continuing relevance of precodification precedent is itself a matter of
legislative intent that cannot be presumed simply by reciting a canon of construction. On the
contrary, the more natural presumption is that Congress’s intentions in this regard may vary from
provision to provision. Instead of analyzing the issue, the Kirtsaeng Court simply relied on an
inference from silence in Bobbs-Merrill and on a concession by the Solicitor General, who
appeared as an amicus. A more direct analysis of legislative intent would have been more
appropriate.
In its amicus brief, the U.S. government advanced a subtle argument for giving the courts
a more active role that not only preserves the relevance of precodification precedent, but also
leaves room for further judicial development of the first sale doctrine. Where Section 109(a)
applies, it supersedes Section 106 and determines whether the conduct in question violates
copyright. Where Section 109(a) does not apply, courts remain free to shape whether particular
conduct violates the distribution right, just as Bobbs-Merrill decided whether particular conduct
contravened the antecedent vending right. This would allow the courts to place some limits on
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copyright holders’ ability to restrict the resale of foreign manufactured copies even if they are
not subject to the first sale doctrine.213 Quality King did not present the Court with an
opportunity to address this question, because the goods were manufactured in the United States
and thus were clearly governed by Section 109(a).
The success of this argument depends on whether one believes that Congress regarded
the list of restrictions on the exclusive rights granted to copyright holders enumerated in Sections
107 to 122 to be comprehensive. If they were not comprehensive, then courts may well retain
some role in determining the contours of copyright law. If comprehensive, such judicial
involvement would be improper.
Continuing judicial innovation with respect to the first sale doctrine would require some
indication that Congress only regarded Section 109(a) as a partial reification of the first sale
doctrine. Although such questions are always debatable, the detailed nature of Sections 107 to
122 suggests that they represent the entirety of Congress’s thinking on the subject matter that
they cover. The Supreme Court’s observation that “the basic holding in Bobbs-Merrill is now
codified in § 109(a)” would seem to contradict claims that Bobbs-Merrill-style innovations fall
outside the scope of Section 109(a).214
Lastly, policy considerations offer no clear guidance to the interpretive question, because
the policy implications from either construction are unattractive. Holding the first sale doctrine
applicable to foreign manufactured copies would raise a host of problems. It would allow anyone
to defeat the purpose of Section 602(a) simply by buying indirectly. Moreover, import
restrictions facilitate price discrimination, which is widely recognized as a necessary condition to
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the efficient provision of copyrighted works.215 Moreover, if companies are unable to prevent
copies intended for sale outside the United States from being diverted back to the United States,
they will have no choice but to charge a uniform price, which will disadvantage consumers in
countries with low willingness or ability to pay.
At the same time, exempting foreign manufactured copies from the first sale doctrine
would create a different set of policy anomalies. As Justice Sotomayor noted during oral
argument, such a rule would prevent a U.S. resident who bought an edition of a book meant to be
sold exclusively in England from bringing it home.216 As Justice Breyer noted, it would also
permit foreign companies who manufacture and sell cars with GPS systems containing
copyrighted information to exercise control over the used car market.217 It would give foreign
manufactured copies greater protection than domestically manufactured copies,218 thereby
providing incentives to shift manufacturing operations offshore.219
The best reading of these statutes still appears to militate against recognizing broad
judicial authority to refine the contours of the first sale doctrine. The legislative intent reflected
in the statutory text and the legislative history and the interpretive approach reflected in Supreme
Court precedent all suggest that continuing judicial innovation would be improper. Although
policy considerations exist on both sides, until the Supreme Court’s decision in Kirtsaeng,220
courts regarded such policy considerations as illegitimate bases for statutory interpretation.221
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More to the point, the scope of judicial authority in shaping copyright is not something
that can be determined categorically. Instead, it is a contextual question that requires a careful
assessment of the legislature’s intent with respect to a particular issue. As such, the resolution
may depend on the particular theory of legisprudence to which particular judges adhere. More
than any other issue discussed in this chapter, the role of the courts with respect to the first sale
doctrine depends on the weight placed on text, legislative history, the interpretive approach
reflected in the precedents, and policy considerations.
E.

Other Doctrines Unaddressed by the Statute
An interesting question is posed by the scope of the judiciary’s authority in areas where

Congress has not acted at all. A classic example is with respect to infringement, where in the
absence of any legislative guidance the courts have fashioned a wide array of tests to determine
whether copying has occurred.222 Where Congress has not acted, there is no legislative intent to
try to discern. Although it is conceivable that the absence of legislation may reflect an
affirmative endorsement of the judicially developed law as it existed at any particular moment, at
a minimum such a conclusion would require active consideration of a potential intervention and
a decision not to do so on the grounds that doing so was unnecessary. And even such action
would be ambiguous at best. Legislative inaction can stem from a host of reasons, with a tacit
endorsement of the status quo from an affirmative desire to freeze it in place being only one (and
a relatively unlikely one at that).
What inference should courts draw about their authority in areas of copyright law that
Congress has left untouched? The absence of legislative intervention into an area gives rise either

222

See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in Copyright Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 203, 216–20 (2012).

43

44
to an implicit delegation to the courts or at least a tolerance of continued judicial development.
Moreover, as a practical matter, judges must still decide cases even in the absence of affirmative
legislative guidance, so it is hard to see what alternative they would have. Such authority would
not be an act of federal common law of the type invalidated by Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.223
Instead, it would focus on interpreting broad statutory terms that have not yet received
congressional attention, as typically occurred in early copyright cases. All of this would change
should Congress choose to intervene. But the scope of that intervention would be subject to the
type of contextual analysis undertaken earlier.
CONCLUSION
One of the signature changes of the past few decades is the Supreme Court’s growing
emphasis on statutory text and on formal approaches to statutory interpretation. As textualism
has grown more influential, it has prompted a reaction from those who are dissatisfied with it as
a methodology or with the answers that it yields. Those wishing to counter the increasing
influence of textualism have begun to call for recognizing greater judicial authority to
incorporate contemporary values when construing statutes. Academic dissatisfaction with recent
changes to the copyright statutes may make copyright particularly fertile ground for such
entreaties.
Any evaluation of these proposals must make sure to honor the basic commitments to
democracy reflected in the U.S. system of government. Any proposals that involve giving courts
greater authority must also recognize that judicial decision-making processes have their
shortcomings as well. A complete analysis requires a comparison of legislatures’ and courts’
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relative institutional competencies as well as the key legitimating function played by legislative
supremacy.
Furthermore, closer analysis of the relative positions in this debate reveals that the role of
courts in articulating copyright law is not susceptible to simple policy inferences or sweeping
generalizations. The question is not so much between judicial and legislative authority in the
abstract, but rather an allocation of responsibility that leaves substantial scope for judicial
lawmaking, subject to legislatively enacted limits to judicial discretion. Determining the proper
balance of decision-making authority between judges and legislators in any particular case thus
turns out to be a context-specific inquiry that can vary with each statutory provision and even
across issues contained within the same statutory provision. A court should eschew broad
categorical approaches, such as categorically analogizing to patent law, in favor of more granular
analysis of the precise contours of legislative intent.
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